|
Flexibility so that a large variety of protection objectives can be addressed
|
M
|
|
Large number of stakeholders
|
M
|
|
Stakeholders with a high exposure to antagonistic attacks (exposing less exposed stakeholders)
|
A
|
|
The initiating event might impair both passive and active fire safety features
|
A
|
|
Common-cause failure due to large number of protection systems and increased probability for common-cause failure due to larger initiating event.
|
A/M
|
|
A lot of different functions provided, however not all are of main concern and the most important ones need to be determined
|
M
|
|
The fire severity, fire development or growth rate might be higher than what is usually designed for (including what protection systems are designed for)
|
A/M
|
|
Support systems that are important for functions and fire safety features
|
A/M
|
|
Domino effects (e.g. fire following explosion)
|
A
|
|
Location of fire (critical locations, e.g. sensitive areas, smaller fires where fire protection do not achieve the protection objective)
|
A/M
|
|
Security features (surveillance, access control, easy access areas etc.)
|
A
|
|
How to determine relevant antagonistic attacks (both large scale and small as arson)
|
A
|
|
First priority should be life safety then the core function of the building
|
A/M
|
|
Core functions of the building and relevant stakeholders need to be determined
|
A/M
|
|
Areas or functions needed to handle an ongoing event need to be analyzed
|
A/M
|
|
Guidance on firm and measurable protection objectives
|
M
|
|
Flexibility to take into account emergency management plans and action plans
|
M
|
|
Higher tendency for failure of protection system due to maintenance issues
|
M
|
|
Passive protection might be inadequate due to maintenance problems
|
M
|
|
External exposures such as a bomb threated vehicle brought into the building for evacuation
|
A
|
|
Method needs to be simple enough to identify and determine scenarios to be analyzed during a site visit
|
-
|
